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Abstract Count Ns like fence, wall or twig notoriously pose problems for the
semantic analysis of the mass/count distinction, given that they exhibit grammatical
count behavior, thus patterning with bona fide count Ns like cat, but unlike the
latter, fail to denote quantized predicates (in Krifka’s (1989) original sense); at the
same time, they do not denote cumulative predicates, unlike mass Ns, such as mud
or water. This puzzling class of count Ns has another intriguing property, so far
largely neglected in contemporary mass/count debates in formal semantics: most
of its members felicitously occur in pseudo-partitive (measure) NP constructions.
Take, for instance, wall, as in Thick woolen drapes of red and gold covered every
inch of wall (COCA). We argue that count Ns like fence, wall or twig fail to denote
quantized predicates, because they admit of multiple overlapping individuation
schemas with respect to what counts as ‘one’. In a nutshell, (i) fence, like cat, but
unlike mud is quantized at specific counting contexts (and so grammatically count),
(ii) fence, like mud, but unlike cat is non-quantized at the null counting context (the
union of interpretations across all specific counting contexts), which make them
felicitous in pseudo-partitive (measure) NPs.
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1 Main data and question
A large class of count Ns like fence, sequence, wall, branch, arc, hedge, twig, line,
band, table are notoriously problematic for any semantic analysis of the mass/count
distinction. They are count, because they satisfy a hallmark grammatical property
of count Ns, such as straightforward compatibility with numerical modifiers, which
mass Ns lack:
(1) three catsC/fencesC
(2) three #snowsM/#furnituresM
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Singular count NPs in measure constructions
Notionally, there is a striking split among count Ns with respect to how their CRITE-
RION OF INDIVIDUATION, and what is ‘one’ countable entity in their denotation,
is specified. Only ‘sortal’ count Ns like cat (see Pelletier 1975 for the use of ‘sor-
tal’ in this context) lexically determine their unique criterion of individuation in a
way that is context-independent. However, count Ns like fence do not. What we
take to be ‘one’ in their denotation is not constant through space and time, but is a
fundamentally context-sensitive notion.
This notional split among grammatical count Ns was first debated in connection
with Krifka’s (1986; 1989) mereological theory of count Ns. One of its basic tenets
is that singular count Ns uniformly denote QUANTIZED predicates. For instance, (a)
cat is quantized, because if it holds of some individual, it cannot also hold of some
of its proper parts. However, as Krifka (1989: 87n, due to Partee, p.c.) also observes,
there are singular count Ns like twig or sequence which fail to denote quantized
predicates. For instance, if you have something that falls under the description of
(a/one) twig and break it into two, each part may still be describable by (a/one) twig.
Depending on our perspective, a fence may be a part of another fence, a sequence
(of numbers) may be part of another sequence, a bouquet may have a part that is
another bouquet. But this means that quantization per se is not a necessary semantic
condition for Ns to be grammatically count. This raises the following question:
QUESTION 1: If grammatical counting depends on some notion of individuation,
how can it be best characterized, given that it cannot be some context-independent
individuation concept inherent in the lexical structure of all count Ns?
In order to address the context-sensitivity of count Ns like fence, Rothstein (2010,
2017) proposes that all count Ns have lexical meanings partially specified by context
which identifies contextually disjoint sets in their denotation (her ‘semantic atoms’).
Acknowledging that this might motivate why count Ns like cat and also count Ns
like fence exhibit the same behavior in count syntax, what still remains puzzling
is the observation that only singular count Ns like fence, but not those like cat, are
perfectly natural and felicitous in the measure (pseudo-partitive) NP:
(3) a. #three pounds of catC
b. The crowd lines 100 yards of fenceC, three deep. (COCA)
Most agree that the measure (pseudo-partitive) NP disallows singular count Ns, and
sanctions mass terms and bare plurals (Krifka 1989; Filip 1992, 2005; Schwarzschild
2002, 2006; Nakanishi 2007; Landman 2016 i.a.):
(4) a. three inches of snowM
b. three crates of furnitureM
c. three baskets of kittensC
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Although not all singular count Ns that fail to denote quantized predicates are
felicitous in the pseudo-partitive (measure) NP, e.g. #three rows of sequence, it is
highly significant and puzzling that there are any singular count Ns that are felicitous
in this construction, e.g., fence, hedge, wall, twig, branch etc., given that, at first
blush, this could be taken to mean that fence-like Ns are not count Ns at all, but
rather dual-life Ns, on a par with cake or stone. If fence-like Ns were dual-life, they
ought to be felicitous in all count and mass/plural syntactic environments. However,
this prediction is not borne out, because Ns like fence and hedge cannot occur as
bare singulars in all argument positions, unlike mass Ns (5):
(5) Water/#fence/#hedge/#cat lay between us and the giant alligators.
What the above observations suggest that is that any adequate analysis of count
Ns must account not only for the context-sensitivity of grammatically count Ns like
fence, but also for their seemingly puzzling compatibility with the pseudo-partitive
measure NP. Put differently, it must answer the following question:
QUESTION 2: If both singular count Ns like cat and fence behave grammatically
alike in count syntax, as evidenced by (1), and if both are ungrammatical in mass
syntax, as evidenced by (5), why are ONLY singular count Ns like fence also perfectly
natural and felicitous in the measure (pseudo-partitive) NP?
2 Background
2.1 Krifka (1989): From cumulativity and quantization to extensive measure
functions
Krifka (1989, 1995) proposes that basic lexical mass and count Ns are typally distin-
guished, but all take their denotation from a SINGLE domain algebraically structured
by means of a complete join semilattice, undetermined with respect to atomicity (in
departure to the double-domain ontology, atomic and non-atomic, originally pro-
posed by Link (1983)). A defining property of mass Ns is CUMULATIVE reference
(Quine 1960). In the simplest terms, if there are two entities to which P applies, P
also applies to their mereological sum:
(6) CUMULATIVE P : ∀P[CUM(P)↔∀x∀y[P(x)∧P(y)→ P(xunionsq y)]]
Mass Ns are analyzed as one-place predicates that lexically specify only a
qualitative criterion of application: e.g. JwaterK = λx[WATER(x)]. Basic lexical
count Ns (boy, apple) have QUANTIZED reference (a predicate P is quantized if and
only if whenever it holds of something, it does not hold of any of its proper parts):
(7) QUANTIZED P: ∀P[QUA(P)↔∀x∀y[P(x)∧P(y)→¬(x@ y)]]
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Count Ns lexically specify not only a qualitative but also a quantitative criterion
for their application, which is represented by means of the NU function, standing
for a ‘natural unit’, e.g., the organism for living beings (Krifka 1989: 84), and
ensures quantization of basic lexical count Ns. Count N denotations are analyzed
as 2-place relations between entities and numbers: e.g. JappleK= λnλx[APPLE(x)∧
NU(APPLE)(x) = n]. Formally, NU is an extensive measure function, and just as other
extensive measure functions µ , including standard measures like OUNCE, HOUR,
LITER, it is additive (see Krantz, Luce, Suppes & Tversky 1971). An additive
measure function tracks the part structure of entities it measures. For instance,
adding 2 lbs of apples to 3 lbs of apples yields 5 lbs of apples, which weighs more in
pounds than the quantity of any of its proper parts.1 Krifka (1989) analyzes extensive
measure functions as ‘quantizing modifiers’ that derive quantized predicates (e.g.,
500 kgs of wool/potatoes) from non-quantized ones (e.g., wool, potatoes):
(8) QUANTIZING MODIFICATION:
∀P∀Q[QMOD(P,Q)↔¬QUA(P)∧QUA(Q(P)) (Krifka 1989: 82)
As observed at the outset, the quantization property (7) is not a necessary
condition for Ns to be grammatically count, as Krifka (1989: 87n, due to Partee,
p.c.) also observes. He mentions two examples: twig and sequence. For instance,
the sequence of numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 is a sequence that has a proper subpart, 2, 3, 4
which is also a sequence of numbers, and both fall under sequence (Zucchi & White
1996, 2001). But this means that the denotation of sequence does not consist of
stable ‘natural units’ but can be rather arbitrary.
Krifka’s quantizing modification yields quantized predicates. One of the reasons
for this is the ungrammaticality of phrases like *hundred grams of five hundred
meters of wool (Krifka 1998: 202, (12c)), which is predicted on the assumption
that the pseudo-partitive (measure) NP five hundred meters of wool is quantized.
If so, then this straightforwardly precludes the application of hundred grams to it,
which requires only non-quantized predicates. Nonetheless, the requirement that
the quantizing modification yield only unambiguously quantized predicates might
be too strong. Pseudo-partitive (measure) NPs like twenty kilos of potatoes/flour
seem to also admit of what looks like a ‘massy’, ¬QUA(P), interpretation, under
certain narrowly defined conditions (for similar examples see also Rothstein 2011
and Landman (2016)):
(9) 60 pounds of potatoes is too much even for Sam to lift.
In (9), the predicate has a singular agreement on the verb and it contains much,
which only selects for mass predicates. This would seem to indicate that the subject
measure NP 60 pounds of potatoes does not have a quantized plural count NP
1 For a formal definition of an extensive measure function see Champollion & Krifka 2016: §13.21.
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interpretation tout simple. At the same time, the bare plural term (here potatoes)
used in the measure (pseudo-partitive) NP to denote what is measured should be best
viewed as retaining its individuated, plural count, structure, as Krifka (1989) and
Landman (2016), among others, agree (pace Rothstein 2011). If measure NPs like 60
pounds of potatoes do not always have a quantized interpretation, as (9), for instance,
shows, then what still remains puzzling, however, is the ungrammaticality of pseudo-
partitive (measure) NPs like *hundred grams of five hundred meters of wool (Krifka
1998: 202, (12c)). If we were to assume that a pseudo-partitive (measure) NP like
five hundred meters of wool has either a quantized or a non-quantized interpretation
available, depending on context, as Rothstein (2011) and Landman (2016) argue,
why is it incompatible with an extensive measure phrase like hundred grams (of),
which selects non-quantized predicates?
2.2 Rothstein (2010): Disjointness at a counting context
Rothstein (2010) develops a theory of the mass/count distinction in which context-
sensitive count Ns like fence or wall take the center stage. Their existence renders im-
plausible any uniform analysis of all count Ns in terms of some context-independent
individuation concept inherent in their lexical structure, be it an NU function in Krifka
1989, 1995, or ‘atom’ in a join semilattice along the lines of Chierchia 1998. The
overall perspective Rothstein (2010) takes is best illustrated with her leading exam-
ple, fencing around a square field. It may be viewed as one or four non-overlapping
fences in the same situation under different criteria of individuation. Consequently,
the question How many fences are there? has no determinate answer. A perfectly
felicitous answer is Four fences, but also One fence, depending on the individu-
ation schema we choose to apply. According to Rothstein (2010), counting as a
grammatical operation depends on atomicity relative to a counting context, which
is a subset of the domain of entities which count as atomic units for the purpose
of counting. Put in more technical terms, grammatical counting relies on counting
〈entity,context〉 pairs, i.e., a denoted entity and the context in which it counts as
one. For our example above, and assuming the four sides are a, b, c, and d, we get:
In context k1: |{〈a,k1〉,〈b,k1〉,〈c,k1〉,〈d,k1〉}|= 4 (Four fences)(10)
In context k2: |{〈aunionsqbunionsq cunionsqd,k2〉}|= 1 (One fence)(11)
The formal implementation of this idea has all lexical Ns associated with a root
meaning, which is a subset of a complete atomic Boolean algebra M. Count Ns are
typally distinct from mass Ns. Mass N denotations are a subset of root meanings,
and of the standard predicative type 〈e, t〉. Count N denotations are uniformly of the
type 〈e× k, t〉, i.e., they denote functions from pairs consisting of an individual e
and a counting context k, in which that individual counts as ‘one’, to truth values.
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Count N denotations are derived from root N denotations by means of a semantic
COUNTk(N) operation which selects, for a counting context k, a set of disjoint
‘semantic atoms’, in default cases.
Rothstein’s analysis of count N denotations has the right motivation for context-
sensitive count Ns like fence, for which it was developed, but it requires the same
‘indexical’ (ibid., p.362) analysis also for count Ns like cat, for which counting
operations are not context-sensitive. This predicts a uniform behavior for all count
Ns, both semantic and distributional. But this prediction is not borne out. If
singular count Ns like fence denote only disjoint ‘semantic atoms’ in default counting
contexts, as Rothstein (2010) proposes, then it is unexpected that they are felicitous
in the pseudo-partitive measure NP (e.g., three yards of fence) and with quantifiers
like much (e.g., much fence), both of which reject singular count predicates.
2.3 Landman (2011, 2016): Context-sensitive non-overlap
Landman’s (2011; 2016) theory of the mass/count distinction is motivated by the idea
that counting is a matter of non-overlap, or overlap that cannot be made irrelevant
in a given context. All Ns have their denotations built from ‘generators’, which are
‘the things that we would want to count as one’. Grammatical counting amounts
to counting elements in a generator set. The denotations of count Ns (cat) are built
from non-overlapping generators. Counting in the count domain succeeds, because
count Ns only denote sets of disjoint entities. In contrast, mass Ns are built from
overlapping generators, which leads to overspecification (Landman 2011: 17) with
respect to how many countable entities there are in their denotation simultaneously
in the same context: There is no single set of entities that count as ‘one’ in a given
context. There are many such sets simultaneously in the same context, and they
overlap; and because there are too many things to count and no single way of
counting them, counting in the mass domain ‘goes wrong’.
One of Landman’s (2011) innovations is to identify two cases when counting
‘goes wrong’: (i) MESS mass Ns like water, salt, meat, which have denotations built
from overlapping minimal generators, i.e., the smallest things we may count as one;
(ii) NEAT mass Ns like kitchenware, furniture, silverware, aka ‘object’ or ‘fake’ mass
Ns, which have denotations built from overlapping generators, but their overlap is
not located in the minimal generators, but at the level of their sums.
The idea that mass Ns are built from overlapping generators makes for a com-
pelling analysis of NEAT mass Ns like kitchenware, furniture, silverware, which
serve as Landman’s main data point. Although they denote sets of atomic entities
just like prototypical count Ns, they are grammatically mass, so cannot be used in
counting constructions: cp. #three kitchenware(s) versus three cups. Suppose we
have a domain with three kitchenware items: a teacup, a saucer and a teapot. There
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is more than one way of partitioning this domain into countable units (variants in
Landman’s terminology). For instance, we can count the minimal generators sitting
‘at the bottom’ of the Boolean algebra associated with kitchenware. On this way of
counting, the result is 3. Or, we may count a teacup and a saucer together as one
unit of kitchenware, a generator (though not a minimal one), and a teapot as another
item, and on this way to count, the result is 2. Alternatively, we can view a teacup,
a saucer and a teapot all together as having a joint function qua a single tea set,
and from this perspective on counting, the counting result is 1. But this means that
there is no single way of counting, and, as Landman puts it, ‘counting goes wrong’.
The key idea here is that there is more than one way of partitioning the denotation
of NEAT mass Ns like kitchenware with respect to what we may view as single
countable units simultaneously in the same context. If you insist on counting them,
you will always end up counting overlapping units, and arrive at different counting
results, because the different possible partitions overlap. There is no principled way
of ignoring such overlaps, or making them irrelevant, because there is no principled
way of privileging one single partition over others.
However, the idea that mass Ns are built from overlapping generators does not
fare well in motivating the mass property of MESS mass Ns like water, salt, meat.
Landman (2011) assumes an atomistic domain, just like Chierchia (1998, 2010) and
Rothstein (2010), but this presupposes that we know, relative to a context, what the
minimal elements in the denotation of MESS mass Ns are, and hence a solution to
the notorious MINIMAL PARTS PROBLEM. Therefore, Landman (2016) abandons
defining MESS mass Ns in terms of overlapping minimal generators, what he there
calls minimal bases. Instead, mass Ns are MESS mass if they are not neat, which
leaves open the possibility that the bases of MESS mass Ns are atomless. This
means that Landman (2016) sides with Krifka (1989); Sutton & Filip (2016b) i.a., in
adopting a non-atomic mereology.
3 Empirical evidence: Countability and measure constructions
As observed above, grammatical countability of a given N is not necessarily aligned
with that N specifying a unique, context-independent criterion of individuation
for its application. Although count Ns like fence, twig, sequence do not lexically
specify such a criterion, they pattern with count Ns like cat, boy, letter, which
do, in so far as they exhibit grammatical count properties, including the following
ones: (i) direct modification by numerical expressions (three cats, three fences);
(ii) straightforward acceptability as arguments of count quantifiers (each cat, each
fence); (iii) pluralization (cats, fences); (iv) occurrence as bare singulars in argument
positions is highly restricted (There was apple in the salad, Kim bought *apple/*fence
in the store yesterday, *Apple/*Fence lay on the kitchen counter).
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While the above data clearly speak for the grammatically count status of singular
Ns like fence, wall, twig, branch or sequence, their straightforward acceptability in
the measure (pseudo-partitive) NP sets them apart from singular count Ns like cat,
baby or cabin. As we see below, baby is odd or highly marked in in the measure
(pseudo-partitive) NP, which may possibly be exploited for special rhetorical effects:
(12) a. # 6 kilograms of baby
b. # You can find a heavy piece of baby in the nursery.
(13) a. Thick woolen drapes of red and gold covered every inch of wall. (COCA)
b. Thus a cm dry length of twig increased in dry weight by 0.047g. (Commu-
nity Ecology of a Coral Cay, Heatwole et al. p.152)
c. The cages were 1 foot in diameter and enclosed a 3-foot length of branch.
(California Agriculture. Mar-Apr, 1989 p.7)
d. 155 kilometers, or 96 miles, of wall encircled West Berlin (CNN “Berlin
wall secrets”)
The above data are puzzling, given that most agree that no singular count Ns
should be straightforwardly acceptable in the measure (pseudo-partitive) NP (Bach
1981; Krifka 1989; Filip 1992, 2005; Schwarzschild 2002, 2006; Nakanishi 2007;
Landman 2016, i.a.). If both baby and fence exhibit grammatically count behavior,
in compliance with the diagnostics in (i)-(iv) above, why are singular count Ns like
fence, but not like baby, perfectly natural and felicitous in the measure (pseudo-
partitive) NP? If singular count Ns such as fence freely occur in count syntax,
which depends on some notion of quantization (Krifka 1989), semantic atomicity
(Rothstein 2010) or disjointness (Landman 2011, 2016), for example, how can it be
that such Ns are also felicitous in the pseudo-partitive measure NP, which does not
welcome singular predicates that are quantized, semantically atomic or disjoint?
4 Formal analysis
Cumulativity (see (6) in Section 2.1) plays a key role in characterizing the application
domain of extensive measure phrases, i.e., phrases consisting of a numerical or some
other weak quantifier followed by an extensive measure expression like gram(s),
kilometer(s). The application domain of extensive measure phrases is commonly
assumed to be restricted to mass or plural count predicates, so satisfying the
CUM property (also Krifka 1998, i.a.). We, however, argue that it is better
viewed as satisfying a weaker ¬QUA property, as Krifka (1989) (see Section 2.1)
originally proposed, albeit for different reasons. Our main motivation is to account
for the felicitous use of singular count Ns like fence in the pseudo-partitive (mea-
sure) NP, given that they do not (necessarily) denote CUM predicates, but ¬QUA
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predicates. Non-quantization is weaker than cumulativity, because CUM(P) asym-
metrically entails ¬QUA(P). It is not possible for a predicate to be both cumulative
and quantized, but it is possible for a predicate to be both non-quantized and not
cumulative.
Neither would Landman’s non-disjointness, or overlap, be a better candidate
for specifying the input condition of measure phrases. There is a subtle, albeit
important, difference between Krifka’s quantization and Landman’s disjointness.
It shows up in both measuring and counting constructions. Take, for instance, a
predicate with the set {aunionsq bunionsq c,cunionsq d unionsq e} in its denotation. Such a predicate is
quantized in Krifka’s sense, but not disjoint in Landman’s sense, because its members
overlap in the c element. Similarly, two sides of fencing that share a corner post
may satisfy the description two fences (see also above), as most would agree, despite
their overlap in the corner post. (It is not entirely clear whether this overlap can or
cannot be made irrelevant, pace Landman 2011.) But this means that in order to
motivate the application of counting operation over a given domain, requiring its
disjointness seems too strict, and quantization relative to a predicate is the better
notion. Moreover, if two fences may refer to two sides of fencing overlapping in a
corner post, and if the restriction on measuring were overlap or not disjointness, then
this would incorrectly predict that #two meters of two fences should be acceptable.
Therefore, also when it comes to measuring, non-quantization of the predicate
denoting what is measured is the better notion than non-disjointness.
From the point of view the property of quantization, we may rephrase our main
QUESTION 2 as follows: ‘How can it be that count Ns such as fence can be directly
modified by numericals, which presupposes that they denote quantized predicates,
and also be felicitous in the pseudo-partitive (measure) NP which presupposes that
they denote non-quantized predicates?’ Our answer, in broad terms, is that Ns such
as fence are special in the following way:
The predicates for e.g., single fences are quantized at each specific
counting context, but non-quantized at the null counting context.
The definitions of specific counting context and null counting context will be intro-
duced in the next section.
4.1 Common nouns and counting contexts
Sutton & Filip (2016a,b) and Landman (2011, 2016) propose to treat common noun
lexical entries as ordered pairs. For Landman (2016), this is 〈body,base〉 in which
base is the counting base predicate, and body is a subset of the upward closure
of the base under mereological sum. For example, the entry for the plural noun
cats is given as 〈∗CAT,CAT 〉. Sutton & Filip (2016a,b) argue the need to explicitly
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represent an individuation function (IND) and counting contexts c in counting base
predicates. Individuation functions apply to number neutral predicates P and return
the set of entities that can count as one P. With the addition of a counting context
c, (schematically, c(IND(P))) we get the set of entities that count as one P at a
counting context c (i.e., under a particular counting perspective).
Here, we combine elements of these two approaches. We assume a predicate
for the extension of the noun, and a counting base predicate. Both the counting
base predicate and the extension predicate may include the IND function and a
counting context. We also add a third projection to our lexical entries to track
presuppositions (or, perhaps more neutrally, preconditions) for composition, such as
Krifka’s (1989) restriction that extensive measure phrases compose with only non-
quantized predicates. Consequently, lexical entries of common Ns, in our account,
are of the form 〈extension,c_base, preconditions〉.2
Before we provide examples of lexical entries, we give some details about these
two important features of our analysis: the IND function and counting contexts.
The IND function is of type 〈〈e, t〉,〈e, t〉〉. It applies to a number neutral predicate
P of type 〈e, t〉 and returns the set of entities that count as one with respect to that
predicate. (So IND(P) is of type 〈e, t〉.) Whether IND is included in a lexical entry
is sensitive to the prelinguistic object versus stuff distinction (see Soja, Carey &
Spelke 1991, also Barner & Snedeker 2005; Rothstein 2010, i.a.).
For mass Ns like mud that denote undifferentiated stuff, there is, intuitively,
nothing that clearly counts as ‘one’. Therefore, the counting base predicate, lacks
the IND function, amounting to the number neutral predicate P.
For Ns which denote Spelke objects or collections thereof, the counting base
predicate is derived by means of the IND function, and it is introduced into the
lexical entries, including those denoted by ‘fake’ or ‘object’ mass Ns like furniture,
and jewelry. So applying IND to a number neutral predicate P yields a set of entities
that either (i) is always maximally disjoint, or (ii) includes overlapping variants
(maximally disjoint sets). Examples of case (i) include Ns that are ‘naturally atomic’
in that they denote clearly individuable entities, such as Ns denoting natural kinds
(cat, apple). Examples of case (ii) include Ns that are collective artifact Ns (furniture,
jewelry) and also Ns which refer to objects, but which rely on context to determine
what is taken to be one entity in their denotation (fence, hedge). For example, a pair
of earrings can count as one item of jewelry or as two (Landman 2011), and fencing
around a field can count as one fence, or as four fences. (For a fuller discussion of
these noun classes, see, amongst others, Sutton & Filip 2016a,b.)
Building on some independent suggestions in Rothstein 2010 and Landman 2011,
2 In order to modify these different projections in composition with other expressions, we use the
projection functions pi1, pi2, and pi3 such that:
if X = 〈φ ,ψ,χ〉〈a×b× c〉, then pi1(X) = φa, pi2(X) = ψb and, pi3(X) = χc
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we assume a set of SPECIFIC COUNTING CONTEXTS C = {c1, ...,cn} which apply to
possibly overlapping sets and yield maximally disjoint subsets. The latter, maximally
disjoint subsets, roughly correspond to Landman’s (2011) variants, or counting
contexts (or ‘counting perspectives’) in Rothstein’s sense (for more detail see Sutton
& Filip 2016b). Specific counting contexts are functions of type 〈〈e, t〉,〈e, t〉〉 (which
is in a slight departure from Sutton & Filip 2016b. (So c(IND(P)) is of type 〈e, t〉.)
For example, for the overlapping set in (14), there are two possible counting contexts
c1 and c2, given in (15) and (16), and each contains only non-overlapping entities
that count as ‘one’.
IND(P) ={cup,saucer,cupunionsq saucer}(14)
c1(IND(P)) ={cup,saucer}(15)
c2(IND(P)) ={cupunionsq saucer}(16)
Our null counting context c0 is defined as a function on sets that returns the the
union of interpretations of that set across all specific counting contexts:
(17) c0(X) =
⋃
ci∈C
(ci(X))
This also implies that the null counting context is the identity function on sets (which
is why it is ‘null’):
(18) c0(X) = X
As our simple examples in (14-16) illustrate, depending on the specific counting
context, we may count the singularities, the cup and the saucer each individually as
‘one’, but also their sum as ‘one’; and these two counting variants overlap. Our null
counting context thus captures Landman’s (2011) notion of overlapping variants,
simultaneously in the same context (see above).
Ns are assigned interpretations relative to either a specific counting context
ci ∈ C or the null counting context c0. Together with the semantic properties of
their counting bases, which may be maximally disjoint sets (e.g., cat) or possibly
overlapping sets (e.g., jewelry), this allows us, for a large class of N concepts, to
make predictions about their encoding as grammatically count or mass Ns, and also
when we can(not) expect to find mass/count variation cross- and intralinguistically,
as we show in Sutton & Filip 2016a,b.
Let us now sketch in some detail how these lexical assumptions allow us to
specify lexical entries of mass and count Ns starting with ‘sortal’ count Ns like cat,
apple, boy, and analogous terms cross-linguistically. Based on our world knowledge,
knowing what cat, means includes knowing what is one whole cat in any context,
350
Singular count NPs in measure constructions
and what it is remains stable across all contexts. Such count Ns, therefore, have IND
sets that are maximally disjoint (non-overlapping) when interpreted at any specific
counting context ci ∈C , and consequently, also when interpreted at the null counting
context c0. Their counting base predicates are quantized, which motivates that such
Ns are grammatically count, and stably so cross-linguistically.
In contrast, Ns like mud denote stuff which contains nothing that clearly and
plausibly counts as ‘one’, even at specific counting contexts (barring possibly highly
specialized scientific or technical contexts). As Ns like mud provide no intuitive
individuation schema, there is no IND function in their lexical entry, as we see in
(19). Such predicates are non-quantized, and yield mass concepts. Given that these
properties do not vary with particular context, the context of evaluation for their
counting base predicates is fixed as the null counting context. This is done by having
their lexical entries saturated with the null counting context.3
(19)
JmudKci = λc.λx.〈c0(MUD)(x), λy.c0(MUD)(y), ∅〉 (ci)
= λx.
〈
c0(MUD)(x), λy.c0(MUD)(y), ∅
〉
As already mentioned, Spelke object-denoting Ns which introduce a counting
base predicate derived by means of the IND function, may still depend on context
for specifying what is ‘one’ in their denotation, because it may concern not only
singularities, but also pluralities of objects (see (15) and (16) above). Such Ns
include collective artifact mass Ns (furniture, jewelry) and also count Ns such as
fence, which are the focus of this paper. Given that what counts as one fence is
relative to a specific counting context ci ∈ C and may vary in size from context to
context, at the c0, its counting base IND predicate will not be quantized. At specific
counting contexts ci ∈ C , in which we ‘carve out’ maximally disjoint fence chunks
for the purposes of counting, the counting base IND predicate will be lexicalized by
the count N fence, as we see in (20). This also predicts that when interpreted at the
null counting context c0, the counting base IND predicate will yield a mass noun
concept, which in English is lexicalized by fencing, as we see in (21).JfenceKci = λc.λx.〈c(IND(FENCE))(x), λy.c(IND(FENCE))(y),∅〉(ci)(20)
= λx.
〈
ci(IND(FENCE))(x), λy.ci(IND(FENCE))(y),∅
〉
JfencingKci= λc.λx.〈c0(IND(FENCE))(x),λy.c0(IND(FENCE))(y),∅〉(ci)(21)
= λx.
〈
c0(IND(FENCE))(x), λy.c0(IND(FENCE))(y),∅
〉
4.2 Direct numerical attachment to common nouns
Numerical expressions in English (one, two, etc.) denote numerals: JoneK = 1,JtwoK= 2 etc. For number marking languages, such as English, there is a generally
3 We use ‘∅’ for the empty proposition.
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available type-shifting operation (MOD) which shifts numerical expressions denoting
numerals into numerical modifiers, which can then compose with common Ns.
MOD = λn.λP.λx.
〈
pi1(P(x)), µcard(x,pi2(P(x)) = n, QUA(pi2(P(x)))
〉
µcard(x,Q) is a cardinality function that maps an entity x and a property Q onto a
numeral n (the number of Qs that x is). Numerical determiners also come with a
precondition that the property Q is quantized QUA.
For number marking languages, such as English, numerical expressions which
denote numerals can be shifted using MOD and then compose with common Ns. For
example, for three fences, the result is a set of entities that have fence properties, to
the amount of three relative to the counting of fences in context ci, and presupposes
that the property ci(IND(FENCE)) is quantized. This is shown in (22a-22d). The
∗-operator indicates upwards closure under mereological sum.
JthreeKci = 3(22a)
MOD(JthreeKci)=λP.λx.〈pi1(P(x)),µcard(x,pi2(P(x)) = 3,QUA(pi2(P(x)))〉(22b) JfencesKci = λx.〈∗ci(IND(FENCE))(x), λy.ci(IND(FENCE))(y),∅〉(22c) Jthree fencesKci = MOD(JthreeKci)(Jfence(s)Kci) =(22d)
λx.
〈∗ci(IND(FENCE))(x), µcard(x,λy.ci(IND(FENCE)(y)) = 3,
QUA(λy.ci(IND(FENCE))(y))
〉
However, were one to try to apply three to fencing this quantized precondition would
be false, since c0(IND(FENCE)) is non-quantized (it denotes entities that are proper
parts of each other), and so the result would be infelicitous.
4.3 Pseudo-partitive measure constructions
Any satisfactory analysis of the pseudo-partitive (measure) NP must correctly predict
that it is felicitous with all mass and plural terms, assuming the measure is appropriate
(three pounds of mud versus #three seconds of mud), but not with most singular
count Ns (#three kilos of cat), while sanctioning a certain sizable class of singular
count Ns (300 meters of fence). In a nutshell, we combine the distinction between
specific counting contexts and the null counting context (Sutton & Filip 2016a,b)
with Krifka’s (1989) analysis of the pseudo-partitive (measure) NP as requiring an
extension predicate that is non-quantized. Singular count Ns like fence are felicitous
in the pseudo-partitive (measure) NP, because, if interpreted at the null counting
context, they have non-quantized extension predicates. In this respect, singular count
Ns like fence pattern with mass Ns like mud, and differ from singular count Ns
like cat. The key differences between these three classes of Ns are summarised in
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Quantized counting base
predicate in the lexicon
Quantized extension
at c0
Measure NP accept-
ability
cat Yes Yes No
cats Yes No Yes
fence Yes No Yes
mud No No Yes
Table 1 Measure NP acceptability and quantization property at c0
Table 1. Both cat and fence, but not mud, have counting base predicates which are
quantized as parts of their lexical entries. As we saw in Section 4.2, this allows
the direct attachment of numerical expressions to cat and fence, but not to mud. In
contrast, at the null counting context c0, the extensions of fence and mud, but also
plural Ns like cat, are non-quantized, whereas the counting base predicate of the
singular N cat is quantized. This, we contend, is the property that allows the singular
count N fence, the plural N cats and the mass N mud to felicitously appear in the
pseudo-partitive (measure) NP and explains why the singular count N cat is not
felicitous in this construction.
We propose that words for extensive measure phrases (like meter, kilo) introduce
the presupposition on nominal arguments with which they compose to form a pseudo-
partitive (measure) NP have a non-quantized extension predicate when this predicate
is interpreted at the null counting context c0. This will, in line with data, filter out
singular count Ns such as cat, but allow mass Ns such as mud, plural count Ns such
as cats, but also singular count Ns such as fence. Notice that although the lexical
entry for fence indicates the specific counting context of utterance ci ∈ C as the
context of evaluation, what matters for the felicitous application of an extensive
measure phrase like three meters (of) is that its extension predicate is non-quantized
at the at the null counting context c0. Part of the job of extensive measure phrases
can be seen as applying the null counting context to its nominal argument before it is
evaluated at the context of utterance, then check, as a presupposition of composition,
that its extension is non-quantized.
We give a derivation for three meters of fence in (23a-23d):
JthreeKci = 3(23a) Jmeters ofKci = λn.λP.λd.λx.(23b) 〈
pi1(P(c0)(x)), µm(x,d) = n, ¬QUA(λy.pi1(P(c0)(y)))JfenceK= λc.λx.〈c(IND(FENCE))(x), λy.c(IND(FENCE))(y), ∅〉(23c) Jthree meters of fenceKci = Jmeters ofKci(JthreeKci)(JfenceK) = λd.λx.(23d) 〈
c0(IND(FENCE))(x),µm(x,d) = 3, ¬QUA(λy.c0(IND(FENCE))(y))
〉
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Measure words that denote extensive measure functions (Krifka 1989) (e.g, meter,
kilo) take a numeral and a noun denotation as arguments. Unlike in the direct
numerical modification case, numerical words (three) do not need to be shifted
into numerical modifiers by MOD, but instead denote numerals: JthreeK = 3. The
combination of a measure phrase and numeral with a noun denotation has the
following effect (where (i)-(iii) tally with the first, second and third projection of
the resulting tuple): (i) The base extension is the extension of the noun at the null
counting context. (ii) The extension is restricted to entities that measure n with
respect to the extensive measure function. For words denoting extensive measure
functions like meter, we also assume a contextually provided dimension, d, since, for
example, three meters of fence was before us could refer to three meters of fence in
height or in length. (iii) There is a presupposition that the extension of the argument
noun denotation is non-quantized when evaluated at the null counting context. In
(23d), this presupposition is satisfied, so the measure phrase is felicitous.
If we try to compose e.g. three kilos of with the singular count N cat as in
(24a-24c), the semantics of kilo introduces the presupposition that the extension
predicate of cat is non-quantized at the null counting context. However, IND(CAT)
(the set of single cats) is quantized. When the non-quantized presupposition is false,
our analysis predicts that the measure NP will not be felicitous. In contrast (24d),
the extension predicate of the plural cats is non-quantized at c0, thus three kilos of
cats is felicitous.
Jkilos ofK= λn.λP.λx.(24a) 〈
pi1(P(c0)(x)), µkg(x) = n, ¬QUA(λy.pi1(P(c0)(y)))Jcat(s)K= λc.λx.〈(∗)c(IND(CAT))(x), λy.c(IND(CAT))(y), ∅〉(24b) J#three kilos of catKci =(24c)
λx.
〈
c0(IND(CAT))(x), µkilo(x) = 3, ¬QUA(λy.c0(IND(CAT))(y))
〉
Jthree kilos of catsKci =(24d)
λx.
〈∗c0(IND(CAT))(x), µkilo(x) = 3, ¬QUA(∗λy.c0(IND(CAT))(y))〉
5 Conclusion
We have identified a distinctive lexical property of count Ns like fence that explains
what differentiates them from count Ns like cat and also from mass Ns like mud.
Intuitively, fence-like Ns admit of multiple alternative individuation or counting
schemas simultaneously at any context, while bona fide count Ns like cat are associ-
ated with only one in all contexts. Ns like mud provide no intuitive individuation
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schema for the stuff they denote, no ‘instruction’ about what could plausibly and
reliably be identified as ‘one’ in their denotation.
On our analysis, we propose that Ns like fence and cat denote quantized counting
base predicates at specific counting contexts, and are therefore grammatically count.
At the same time, at the null counting context c0, which is the union of interpretations
across all specific counting contexts, the extension predicate of fence-like Ns is non-
quantized, due to the overlap among members across alternate individuation/counting
schemas. The extension predicates of plural count nouns are non-quantized, sim-
ply because sums of individuals are included in their denotations. The extension
predicates of mass Ns like mud are also non-quantized, but due simply to the lack of
any individuation/counting schema. This, we contend, is the property that allows
singular count Ns like fence, plural count nouns like cats, and mass Ns like mud to
felicitously appear in the pseudo-partitive measure NP. In contrast, singular count Ns
like cat are not felicitous in the measure NP, because their extension predicates are
quantized at the null counting context, as there is only one individuation/counting
scheme that reliably applies to any entities across all specific counting contexts.
We are still left with some puzzles, however. Not all count Ns that fail to be
quantized are felicitous in the pseudo-partitive (measure) NP. While fence-like Ns
are perfectly acceptable in this context, mathematical concepts (sequence, line, arc)
and classifier-like Ns like piece, quantity or bouquet are not. We suspect that the
infelicity of singular count Ns denoting mathematical concepts (e.g., # three rows of
sequence) may be connected to the abstract, mathematical nature of these concepts.
The infelicity of classifier-like Ns (e.g., # three lbs of piece of ice) might have to
do with the bar on measuring the same thing twice (Bach 1981). Finally, we also
observe intriguing differences among the fence-like count Ns. For instance, only
some are also compatible with quantifiers like much whose application is restricted
to mass Ns, at least in some contexts: cf. How much fence do you need?, ‘The
question is how much wall do you need?’ Goodlatte said. ‘You won’t build a 30-foot
high wall along 2000 miles of southern border.’ (The News Virginian, October 18,
2017, "Goodlatte sees drug tunnels and potential fence on border visit.")
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